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In May 2014, a cluster of Yersinia enterocolitica (YE) 
O9 infections was reported from a military base in 
northern Norway. Concurrently, an increase in YE 
infections in civilians was observed in the Norwegian 
Surveillance System for Communicable Diseases. We 
investigated to ascertain the extent of the outbreak 
and identify the source in order to implement control 
measures. A case was defined as a person with lab-
oratory-confirmed YE O9 infection with the outbreak 
multilocus variable-number tandem repeat analysis 
(MLVA)-profile (5-6-9-8-9-9). We conducted a case–
control study in the military setting and calculated 
odds ratios (OR) using logistic regression. Traceback 
investigations were conducted to identify common 
suppliers and products in commercial kitchens fre-
quented by cases. By 28 May, we identified 133 cases, 
of which 117 were linked to four military bases and 16 
were civilians from geographically dispersed counties. 
Among foods consumed by cases, multivariable analy-
sis pointed to mixed salad as a potential source of 
illness (OR 10.26; 95% confidence interval (CI): 0.85–
123.57). The four military bases and cafeterias vis-
ited by 14/16 civilian cases received iceberg lettuce 
or radicchio rosso from the same supplier. Secondary 
transmission cannot be eliminated as a source of infec-
tion in the military camps. The most likely source of 
the outbreak was salad mix containing imported radic-
chio rosso, due to its long shelf life. This outbreak is a 
reminder that fresh produce should not be discounted 
as a vehicle in prolonged outbreaks and that improve-
ments are still required in the production and process-
ing of fresh salad products.
Introduction
Yersinia enterocolitica (YE) infection is the fourth most 
commonly reported cause of bacterial diarrhoeal dis-
ease in Norway [1]. Yersiniosis is notifiable to the 
Norwegian Institute of Public Health (NIPH) via the 
Norwegian Surveillance System for Communicable 
Diseases (MSIS). Since 2008, between 40 and 60 cases 
have been reported annually. More than 80% of yers-
iniosis cases in Norway are due to serotype O3, which 
is also the dominant cause of yersiniosis in Canada, 
Europe, Japan, and parts of the United States [2].The 
highest isolation rates have been reported during the 
cold season in temperate climates, including north-
ern Europe and especially Scandinavia. The incuba-
tion period is generally under 10 days, but most often 
between three and seven days. Typical symptoms of 
yersiniosis include self-limiting acute febrile diarrhoea 
with abdominal pain, which can mimic appendicitis 
and has led to appendectomy [3]. YE infections have 
also been known to lead to sequelae such as reactive 
arthritis, erythema nodosum and conjunctivitis in up to 
12% of cases [4].
Transmission most frequently occurs through eating 
contaminated food, particularly raw or undercooked 
pork, as the pig is the only animal consumed by humans 
which regularly harbours the pathogenic serovars O3 
and O9 [2]. Case–control studies in Finland, Germany, 
New Zealand, Norway and Sweden have found that 
consumption of pork is associated with sporadic yers-
iniosis [5-9]. While outbreaks of yersiniosis have also 
been linked to consumption of pork [10,11], other food 
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items such as milk, water and fresh vegetables have 
also been reported as a source of infection, and an 
outbreak of YE O9 due to imported ready-to-eat salad 
mix occurred in Norway in 2011 [11]. Most yersiniosis 
cases are sporadic and outbreaks are rarely reported 
[12]. Yersiniosis is rarely transmitted through sustained 
person-to-person transmission, although there have 
been previous outbreaks in which food handlers have 
been implicated [13].
The event
On Thursday 8 May 2014, the Food Safety Authorities 
(FSA) District Office for Midt-Troms reported two 
cases of YE infections from a military base in northern 
Norway to the NIPH via the national web-based out-
break reporting system (Vesuv). Three additional cases 
were suspected at the time of the report. Concurrently, 
an increase of YE O9 infections was observed in MSIS 
with nine human isolates of YE O9 from geographically 
dispersed areas of the country received between 5 and 
11 May 2014. The National Reference Laboratory (NRL) 
identified a common profile for the military and civil-
ian cases through multilocus variable number tandem 
repeat analysis (MLVA), which had not been observed 
in Norway before this outbreak. In collaboration with 
the FSA and the military, an outbreak investigation 
was initiated to ascertain the extent of the outbreak, 
determine whether all cases were linked to the military 
and identify the source of the yersiniosis outbreak in 
Norway in order to implement control measures and 
prevent further spread.
Methods
Case finding
Outbreak case definition
For this outbreak a case was defined as any person 
with laboratory-confirmed YE O9 infection with the out-
break MLVA profile (5-6-9-8-9-9) with onset of symp-
tom between 1 March and 15 June 2014. 
Case finding among civilians
In Norway, YE is reportable via MSIS and all isolates 
of presumptive YE are forwarded from clinical microbi-
ology laboratories to the NRL where they are routinely 
characterised phenotypically, biotyped, tested for 
markers of plasmid-associated virulence factors and 
serogrouped against O3, O5,27, O8 and O9. Isolates 
can also be tested for a range of other serogroups 
if needed. The isolates are then MLVA-typed by the 
method described by Gierczyński et al. [14], locally 
adjusted to capillary electrophoresis.
Case finding on military bases
The Norwegian Armed Forces is a conscript military 
with 33 military bases throughout the country. Three 
military bases in the county of Troms in northern 
Norway (military bases T1, T2 and T3) and one mili-
tary base in the county of Hedmark in south-eastern 
Norway (military base H1) reported cases to the NIPH. 
Base T1, the largest of the three bases, is located ca 
40 km from base T2 and ca 30 km from base T3. The 
population of the military bases is composed primar-
ily of privates, who are mostly Norwegians completing 
one year of mandatory military service. The soldiers 
belonging to each base are organised in companies, 
typically composed of 100 to 150 people. Bedrooms are 
typically shared by four to six people; bathrooms can 
be shared by up to 50 people. Privates and officers eat 
in the same mess halls, which are organised such that 
soldiers take food from a buffet table offering several 
hot and cold meal options, as well as a cold salad bar.
Information about cases on military bases was col-
lected through the Military Health Officer. On 13 May 
the Military Health Office requested that all soldiers 
based at the three bases in Troms report to the health-
care centre if they had gastrointestinal symptoms, for 
isolation and testing. All cases diagnosed with yers-
iniosis were subsequently sent home from the military 
base until they provided a stool sample negative for 
YE. All kitchen staff on base T2 were tested, regardless 
of presence of symptoms, while kitchen staff from the 
other bases were only tested if symptomatic.
International enquiry
On 16 May the NIPH sent a message via the European 
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) 
Epidemic Intelligence Information System asking 
whether other European countries were also observing 
an increase in cases of YE infections.
Investigating the source of infection
Trawling questionnaire and further development of a 
short questionnaire for civilian cases
The initial cases, both military and civilian, were inter-
viewed using a standardised 22-page trawling ques-
tionnaire designed to generate hypotheses for possible 
sources of infection in a food-borne outbreak. For the 
identified military cases this questionnaire was admin-
istered on base by the local FSA, prior to being sent 
home from the base. For microbiologically-confirmed 
outbreak cases identified by the NRL that did not have 
any connections to a military base, the district FSA 
would visit the residence of the case to conduct the 
interview, as well as to collect food samples. The trawl-
ing questionnaire included detailed questions about 
food consumption and purchases, animal contact and 
environmental exposures in the week before onset 
of symptoms, as well as clinical and demographic 
information.
Subsequent to analysing information from the trawling 
interviews, a shorter questionnaire was developed for 
civilian cases. This questionnaire focused on foods of 
most interest, which included pork products and raw 
vegetables. It also included questions about potential 
locations of exposure, such as restaurants and caf-
eterias. The short questionnaire was administered to 
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seven civilian cases through the FSA either by phone 
or in person.
Case–control investigation in the military setting
A case–control study was designed in order to iden-
tify the vehicle of infection among privates from two of 
the military bases. Cases identified by 29 May among 
privates in base T1 and among privates in base T2 
were included in the study. Cases from the two most 
affected companies in base T2 were excluded a priori as 
additional factors affecting the occurrence of disease 
were suspected, including secondary transmission. 
Four controls were selected for each case, frequency 
matched by company. Due to security reasons, access 
to lists of privates belonging to each company was not 
provided to the investigators. Therefore, military offi-
cials from the relevant bases were given instructions to 
systematically select controls from an alphabetical list. 
In total, 21 cases (10 cases from T1 and 11 cases from 
T2) and 82 controls (44 controls from T1 and 38 con-
trols from T2) were included in the case–control study.
Based on the hypotheses generated from the trawling 
questionnaire, a short self-administered questionnaire 
was developed for the case–control study. Menus from 
the military kitchens were available and used in this 
process. A total of 36 salad/vegetables items, 17 pork 
products and seven prepared salads that are served in 
the mess hall on a regular basis were included in the 
questionnaire, which was piloted with the head cook 
of the military kitchens and the brigade veterinarian 
before dissemination. Given the wide range in onset 
dates in cases and the anticipated difficulty for military 
personnel to remember the specific food items con-
sumed from a buffet on specific days, both cases and 
controls were asked to indicate what food items they 
consume in a typical two week period in the mess hall.
Data collection
All controls for the case–control study were gathered 
in groups and interviewed in their respective military 
bases on 27 and 28 May 2014. Study participants 
were distributed the paper questionnaire which they 
were asked to complete. Photographs of different 
salad types were shown on a projector. Cases were 
interviewed by telephone by employees of the NIPH 
between 29 May and 10 June, as they had been asked 
to return home after being diagnosed and many had 
left the military base at the time of the study. Cases 
were sent an email with the same photographs of the 
salads shown to the controls and were asked to refer to 
the images while being interviewed.
Data analysis
Data were entered in the web-based questionnaire 
tool Questback. We calculated the number of people 
exposed to various food items, number of ill people 
among the exposed and unexposed and attack rates 
(AR) for all food items. We first analysed the association 
of each food item with yersiniosis one by one (univari-
able analysis). In the next step we selected food items 
which had odds ratios (OR) with a p-value lower than 
0.25 and that had at least 50% of the cases exposed. 
Of these, we selected the three variables with lower 
p-value and stratified. Multivariable analysis was per-
formed using logistic regression with OR, adjusted for 
military camp. We also calculated the dose-response 
association between the amount of salad consumed 
(never, once per month, once per week, several times 
per week and every day) and yersiniosis. This dose-
response was also analysed for the amount of pork 
meat consumed. Descriptive analyses were performed 
in Excel and Stata 12, and univariable and multivari-
able analyses were performed in Stata 12.
Microbiological investigation of food samples
During site inspections, food samples were collected 
from the military base kitchens as well as from sev-
eral commercial kitchens that had served civilian 
cases. Food samples were also collected from the 
homes of civilian cases. Samples were submitted 
to the Norwegian Veterinary Institute for analysis. 
The samples were analysed according to the ISO/
WD Microbiology of food and animal feeding stuffs – 
Horizontal method for the detection of presumptive 
pathogenic YE (version 2012–12–01), which included 
direct plating and alkali treatment of both peptone-
sorbitol-bile (PSB) and irgasan-ticarcillin-potassium 
chlorate (ITC) enrichment broths [15]. The samples were 
plated on both cefsulodin-irgasan-novobiocin (CIN) 
agar and a CHROMagar Yersinia enterocolitica (Paris, 
France). In addition, the samples were cold-enriched 
using a modified version of the Nordic Committee on 
Food Analysis method 117 (NMKL 117) [16]. The PSB 
enrichment broths and suspicious colonies were exam-
ined for the ail gene, an indicator for pathogenic YE, by 
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) [17].
Traceback investigation
The FSA inspected the military base kitchens on 9 May, 
13 May as well as 27 and 28 May 2014. A traceback 
investigation was conducted by the FSA on food items 
by reviewing documentation for suspected food prod-
ucts delivered to the military kitchens and commercial 
kitchens/cafeterias where civilian cases had eaten. The 
FSA contacted the distributers of suspected food items 
and conducted inspections where necessary.
Results
Description of the outbreak
As of 29 July 2014, 133 confirmed cases of YE O9 infec-
tions were reported to the NIPH. Almost 90% of the 
confirmed cases (n = 117) had a confirmed link to one of 
four different military bases (Figure 1). Sixteen cases 
had no reported links to a military case. These cases 
resided in six different counties in Norway – Oslo 
(n = 5), Sør-Trøndelag (n = 4), Oppland (n = 3), Møre og 
Romsdal (n = 2), Akershus (n = 1), and Rogaland (n = 1). 
The 16 civilian cases ranged in age from 24 to 95 years 
(median: 39 years) and just over half were female 
(n = 9). 
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Figure 1
Geographical distribution of cases of Yersinia enterocolitica infection by military base and municipality of residence, 
Norway 2014
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Of the 117 cases from the military bases with identi-
cal MLVA profiles, almost all were reported from three 
bases in Troms county: T1 (n = 14), T2 (n = 88) and T3 
(n = 3). Four cases were reported from military base H1 
in Hedmark county and three cases had links to more 
than one military base (including either T2 or H1). For 
five cases the base was unknown. Cases linked to 
the military bases ranged in age from 19 to 57 years 
(median age: 21) and 21% were female (n = 24). Military 
cases belonged to at least seven battalions and four-
teen companies. At least 32% (n = 37) of all military 
cases belonged to Company X of military base T2. 
Although the exact number of privates in the company 
is unknown, assuming a total company membership of 
between 100 and 150, the attack rate for Company X 
would have been between 25% and 37%. The company 
with the second highest attack rate, also from base T2, 
had 10 cases reported, corresponding to an attack rate 
of 7% to 10%. Seven kitchen personnel were diagnosed 
with yersiniosis, of which two were asymptomatic. All 
of these employees worked in base T2. Symptomatic 
kitchen staff were not identified at any of the other 
bases.
Symptom onset among cases with this information 
available (n=102) ranged from 9 April to 28 May 2014 
(Week 15 to Week 21) (Figure 2). For civilian cases, most 
(n=12) had symptom onset from Week 15 to Week 17, 
while over 90% of military cases (n=81) had symptom 
onset between Week 17 and Week 20.
International requests for information produced 
no reports of similar yersiniosis outbreaks in other 
European countries.
Investigating the source of the outbreak
Trawling interviews
Eighteen military cases, as well as nine of the total 16 
civilian cases were interviewed using the hypothesis-
generating questionnaire. The results of the trawling 
questionnaires from the military bases indicated that 
almost all soldiers ate all their meals in the same mess 
halls. The military mess halls offered a buffet, which 
meant that soldiers could choose what to take, but 
most cases were unaware of how food was prepared 
and which ingredients were used. Many cases reported 
consuming salad from the salad bar. The results of the 
trawling questionnaires for civilian cases suggested 
that all but one of the cases had eaten from restau-
rants or commercial kitchens. In particular, 12 of the 16 
civilian cases interviewed reported eating from salad 
bars at workplace cafeterias.
Case–control study
In the case–control study, 10 food items had at least 
50% of cases exposed and had a p-value < 0.25 in the 
univariable analysis (Table). These were included in the 
multivariable analysis.
Of the 10 significant food items in univariable analy-
sis, salad mix and arugula were the most likely to 
be associated with illness in multivariable analysis. 
Cases were 10 times more likely to have eaten salad 
mix than controls (OR:  10.26; 95% confidence interval 
Figure 2
Distribution of cases of Yersinia enterocolitica infection by 
week of symptom onset, Norway 2014 (n=102)a
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(CI): 0.85–123.57, p-value: 0.067) and 95% of the cases 
(20/21) had eaten the salad mix compared with 70% of 
the controls (57/82). Cases were almost six times more 
likely to have eaten arugula than controls (OR: 5.48; 
95%CI: 1.19–25.19, p-value: 0.029) and 52% of the 
cases (11/21) had eaten arugula compared with 24% of 
the controls (20/82). A dose-response relationship was 
observed between consumption of salad and illness. 
We observed that for every day salad was eaten, the 
risk increased by 9%.
Testing food samples
Fifteen food samples were taken from mess halls, caf-
eterias and private homes at the time of inspection on 
27 May 2014. These included three samples of fresh-
cut mixed salads, one shredded iceberg lettuce, six 
samples of other types of leafy greens (whole heads), 
one sample of carrots (snacks carrots), three sam-
ples of ham and one of bacon. The relevant batches 
of the consumed food products were already eaten or 
destroyed at the time of inspection. All food samples 
tested negative for pathogenic YE.
Traceback investigation
Initial traceback investigations indicated that at least 
14 of 16 civilian cases had eaten at kitchens or caf-
eterias that were supplied by the same distributor of 
fresh fruits and vegetables as the military kitchens 
in all four bases. This distributor holds ca 1% of the 
Norwegian market and uses only Norwegian produce 
during the summer, but imports 70–80% of produce 
during the winter months. At the time of the outbreak, 
the distributor had not yet begun using Norwegian 
products exclusively. Further investigation found that 
almost all kitchens could document receiving salad mix 
(which contains 80% iceberg lettuce and 20% radic-
chio rosso), whole iceberg lettuce or whole radicchio 
rosso with produce originating from one of two coun-
tries. Information about the imports of radicchio rosso 
showed that the import on 6 April 2014 came from 
the previous harvesting season, while the import on 
16 April 2014 was from a new harvesting season. The 
ingredients were washed and salad mixes were assem-
bled at a processing factory in Norway that belongs to 
a subsidiary company to the distributor. An inspection 
of the processing factory where the salad mixes were 
produced for the distributor found significant lapses in 
hygiene, including not changing water in rinsing tanks 
on a regular basis.
As control measures, the distributor improved hygiene 
measures, and the military bases thoroughly cleaned 
the bathrooms and kitchens, and increased aware-
ness on hand hygiene among the soldiers. From Week 
21, the kitchens in all three bases in Troms voluntarily 
elected to close the salad bar and refrain from serving 
pork products until the outbreak was resolved.
Discussion
This outbreak of yersiniosis infection among civilians 
and members of the military was likely associated with 
consumption of fresh salad products. The geographi-
cally widespread occurrence of the yersiniosis cases 
and the prolonged duration indicated that the source of 
the product was widely distributed and available for a 
sustained period of time, which does not immediately 
suggest fresh produce as a source. However, the trace-
back investigations’ results for both the civilian and 
military cases strongly indicate that almost all cases 
were exposed to salad products supplied by the same 
distributer. Although the specific food item responsible 
for the outbreak could not be identified, the traceback 
investigation points towards one of two types of salad 
vegetables as the source: radicchio rosso and iceberg 
lettuce. Of these, radicchio rosso was considered to 
the be the most biologically plausible ingredient as it 
was the only salad component that keeps long enough 
to fit with the duration of this outbreak. Radicchio 
Table
Univariable results of the case–control study of military bases T1 and T2, outbreak of Yersinia enterocolitica O9 infections, 
April–June 2014, Norway
Exposure
Cases (n = 21) Controls (n = 82)
OR (95% CI) P-value
Total Exposed N (%) Total
Exposed 
N (%)
Salad mix 21 20 (95) 82 57 (70) 8.77 (1.24–377.81) 0.015
Iceberg salad 21 20 (95) 82 62 (76) 6.45 (0.90–280.52) 0.046
Cooked ham 21 20 (95) 81 63 (78) 5.71 (0.79–249.76) 0.067
Onion 21 19 (91) 81 54 (67) 4.75 (1.01–44.52) 0.031
Arugula 21 11 (52) 82 20 (24) 3.41 (1.12–10.35) 0.013
Red salad leaves 21 11 (52) 81 20 (25) 3.36 (1.10–10.19) 0.014
Chopped ham 21 18 (86) 82 54 (66) 3.11 (0.80–17.71) 0.077
Salami 21 19 (91) 81 63 (78) 2.71 (0.56–26.03) 0.192
Roast beef 21 17 (81) 81 55 (68) 2.01 (0.57–8.97) 0.242
Cauliflower 21 11 (52) 81 54 (67) 0.55 (0.19–1.65) 0.225
CI: confidence interval; OR: odds ratio.
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rosso has a shelf life of up to 150 days [18], while ice-
berg lettuce has a shelf life of less than two weeks. In 
addition, radicchio rosso is stored at +1 °C before it is 
supplied to the market. These storage conditions allow 
the growth of YE as this bacterium is able to grow down 
to –2 °C. If the implicated radicchio rosso was from the 
previous harvesting season and was imported before 
the changeover to Norwegian produce, it may have 
been stored for a long period of time, facilitating micro-
biological growth. Given the uncommon serotype and 
novel MLVA profile, it is suspected that the contamina-
tion of an imported salad product occurred outside of 
Norway, but potential lapses in processing after impor-
tation may have contributed to the spread.
All samples of salad products were negative for patho-
genic Yersinia, but it is often challenging to isolate 
pathogenic YE from food samples. In a 2011 outbreak of 
yersiniosis associated with pre-mixed salad in Norway, 
non-pathogenic Yersinia was found in packaged sal-
ads [11], indicating that the long-term storage of this 
food product is conducive to the persistence of the 
bacterium. In this previous outbreak, non-pathogenic 
and environmental strains of Yersinia, including YE 
biotype 1A and Y. kristensenii were identified in sam-
ples of mixed salad and radicchio rosso. Radicchio 
rosso was considered to be the most likely source 
of contamination, given the microbiological results 
and the traceback investigation, although this could 
not be conclusively determined. In addition, several 
outbreaks of Y. pseudoturberculosis associated with 
consumption of vegetables such as carrots have also 
suggested the capacity for Yersinia bacteria to multiply 
in contaminated produce stored at cold temperatures 
[19-21]. Arugula is probably the most recognisable of 
the salads that were shown in the pictures, which may 
explain why it was significant in multivariable analysis. 
Salad mixes of the type we suspect to be implicated 
often contain arugula, although the traceback investi-
gation indicates that arugula was not distributed to all 
the implicated commercial kitchens.
The case–control study in the military camps demon-
strated that cases were 10 times more likely to have 
eaten salad mix than controls. Despite not reaching 
statistical significance, this result, along with other 
epidemiological evidence, excludes pork and supports 
salad as the likely source of infection. However, the 
findings do not allow for incrimination of a specific 
type of salad leaf. In the questionnaires we asked the 
respondents to indicate what they consume in a typical 
two week period rather than the two weeks before the 
onset of symptoms. While this supports that the cases 
eat all types of salads more frequently than controls, 
framing the questions in this way may have obscured 
an exposure that was specific to the period before the 
outbreak. In addition, as the salads were prepared in 
commercial kitchens, the study participants were not 
responsible for preparing the salads and may have 
been unable to discern the different types of salad. 
Although we tried to minimise this problem by showing 
photographs of different salad types to the study par-
ticipants, many of the leaves have a similar appearance 
and cannot easily be distinguished.
Outbreaks of gastroenteritis at military bases of differ-
ing aetiologies, particularly norovirus, are not uncom-
mon [22-27], but to our knowledge only one previous 
military outbreak of yersiniosis has been reported, 
from naval troops and infantry in Finland in 1973 [28]. 
Military bases present a unique opportunity for epi-
demiological investigation and for implementation of 
control measures as the population is well defined, 
attends the same healthcare facility and is respon-
sive to requests to participate in investigations. The 
military may also have additional incentives to prevent 
and quickly control outbreaks that occur, as a matter 
of national security. Due to the communal living space, 
washrooms and kitchens, outbreaks in military camps 
can spread quickly through person-to-person transmis-
sion and the implementation of control measures can 
be difficult. In a recent study among military personnel 
deployed as part of the Ebola response in Sierra Leone, 
incidence of gastroenteritis was found to be lower than 
in military personnel deployed in Afghanistan [29]. 
Hygiene policies were similar in both contexts with the 
exception of hand washing, which occurred much more 
frequently in Sierra Leone. Although the deployment 
context is different than being on base, these results 
reinforce the importance of basic hygiene practices in 
reducing the spread of gastroenteritis in a military con-
text. For these reasons, emphasis on personal hygiene, 
isolation of symptomatic cases and extensive disinfec-
tion of common areas, kitchens and washrooms are 
important measures to implement quickly. 
However, few accounts of person-to-person transmis-
sion of YE infection exist and are limited to exposures 
in nosocomial or family settings [30,31]. A study in 
Denmark on the occurrence of household outbreaks 
associated with different pathogens found that the 
tendency for YE to cause household outbreaks was 
low compared with other bacteria, like Salmonella 
Enteritidis and Shigella sonnei [32]. Although it was not 
possible to document the proportion of cases who may 
have been infected through person-to-person trans-
mission, this transmission route may have propagated 
the outbreak. It is possible that different approaches to 
hygiene may have been taken by individuals and groups 
within specific companies, which may have explained 
the differences in attack rates in different companies. 
Varying approaches to testing among the leadership of 
different companies within the military or different lev-
els of worry among some companies may have also led 
to increased interaction with the healthcare services. 
In any case, the importance of hand hygiene, safe food 
preparation measures and appropriate cleaning rou-
tines for washrooms during gastroenteritis outbreaks 
in military camps, regardless of the aetiology, cannot 
be ignored. 
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The role of food handlers in this outbreak is unknown. 
As all seven positive food handlers worked in camp T2, 
this might explain the concentration of cases in that 
camp. Food handlers have been implicated in very few 
outbreaks of yersinosis. In 1981, investigators of an 
outbreak of YE O8 at a summer diet camp concluded 
that a food handler may have introduced the bacteria 
during food preparation [13]. In the 1973 yersiniosis 
outbreak in Finland, two civilian food handlers had pos-
itive faecal samples, but their role in the transmission 
was also unclear [28]. Concerning the military cases in 
Norway, infected food handlers may have propagated 
the outbreak by contaminating food that was served in 
the camp’s kitchen but it is unlikely that a food handler 
introduced the infection as the outbreak commenced 
simultaneously in several locations. In addition, the 
role of infected food handlers cannot explain the high 
attack rate among specific companies within camp T2. 
Other factors, including differences between compa-
nies in exposure to contaminated products, were also 
considered. As members of the same company tend to 
eat at the same time, it is possible that specific groups 
could have been more exposed to a contaminated 
batch depending on when they came to the mess hall 
or which batches were served to different companies. 
However, if this type of disproportionate exposure 
occurred, it cannot fully explain the prolonged duration 
of the outbreak.
Conclusions and recommendations
This outbreak was the largest outbreak of YE infection 
in Norway as of 2014 and the first to be reported from 
a military context. The identification of the most likely 
source of infection, mixed salad, required combining 
information from the epidemiological, environmental, 
and traceback investigations from both civilian and 
military contexts. Person-to-person transmission may 
also have played a role in propagating the outbreak. 
The results of the investigation highlight that fresh 
produce should not be dismissed as possible sources 
in prolonged outbreaks. The implication of salad mix 
reinforces the need for improved control measures in 
the production chain for fresh produce.
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